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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050104-CA
v.
GARYL.DEVERAUX,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals after pleading guilty to burglary of a dwelling, a second degree
felony; possession of stolen property, a second degree felony; and attempted burglary, a third
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: May a defendant who pleads guilty raise an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim on appeal if he failed to pursue a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas?
Issue 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in imposing sentence?
Issue 3: Did the trial court err concerning defendant's motion to withdraw plea and
motion for new counsel?
Standard of Review: Issues one, two and three were raised pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). As to Anders issues, this Court must make a "full

examination of all the proceedings" and decide whether those issues are "wholly frivolous."
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1981).1
Issue 4: Did the trial court err by proceeding with sentencing when defense counsel
claimed that the prosecutor had made a promise to recommend concurrent sentences, but at
sentencing the prosecutor disclaimed any promise and recommended consecutive sentences?
Standard of Review: "A trial court's ruling regarding the enforceability of a plea
agreement is a question of law." State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ^f 10, 17 P.3d 1153.
This Court reviews questions of law for correctness. Id.
Issue 5: Did the trial court err by ordering that the Utah sentence ran consecutive to
a pre-existing Alaska sentence, and then remanding defendant to the Utah Department of
Corrections to serve the Utah sentence first?
Standard of Review: "Sentencing decisions of the trial court are reviewed for abuse
of discretion, including the decision to . . . impose consecutive sentences." State v.
McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, f9, 110 P.3d 149.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004) - terms of imprisonment
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004) - concurrent or consecutive sentences

1

Two additional issues were not raised pursuant to Anders, therefore, appellant's
counsel has not filed a motion to withdraw.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 30, 2004, defendant pled guilty to burglary of a dwelling, possession
of stolen property, and attempted burglary (R39-48). The prosecutor asked for a pre-sentence
investigation (PSI) (Rl 23:3). However, defendant told the court that he wanted to waive the
minimum time period and go forward with sentencing the same day that he entered his plea
(R123:15).
The court imposed consecutive sentences (R123:23). Defendant then asked the court
if a PSI would have made a difference (R123:24). The court said: "I don't know if a PSI
would have made a difference at all." (R123:24). However, following further discussion, the
court recalled the sentence and ordered that a pre-sentence report be prepared (Rl23:26).
On December 3, 2004, defendant filed a letter with the court (R53-54). The letter
asked the court to schedule a hearing so that defendant could ask to replace his counsel and
move to withdraw his guilty pleas (R53-54). Then on December 10, 2004, defendant filed
another letter that asked the court to disregard his request to withdraw his pleas (R58). At
a hearing on December 14,2004, defendant, on the record, withdrew both the motion for new
counsel and the motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R124).
Following preparation of a PSI report, defendant was sentenced on January 11,2005.
His sentences on counts 1 and 3 (the burglary and attempted burglary that were alleged to
have occurred on the same day) were run concurrently (Rl 25:13-15). However, the sentence
for possession of stolen properly was ordered to be served consecutively to the other
sentences (R125:15). In addition, the court said: "[w]ith regard to any other charges that may
3

be pending, I am not going to comment on that." (R125:15). However, the court ordered
that the sentences imposed in this case "be served consecutively with the other sentence the
defendant is currently serving. The only one I'm aware of is the one with (inaudible)
similarities in Alaska." (Rl 25:15). The court then ordered defendant to be transported to the
Utah State Prison to serve his sentence. Id.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts is taken from the factual basis for defendant's plea offered at
defendant's plea hearing (Rl23:7-8).
[0]n or about November 7th, 2004 here in Iron County, Mr. Deveraux
entered a home here in Cedar City, your Honor, at that time and basically
attempted to steal some property.
Pursuant to that he was apprehended, your Honor. Within this same
period of time there was [sic] about nine burglaries here in Cedar City. He
confessed to those, your Honor, and was very forthright. I'll have to give that
to Mr. Deveraux - - of nine different burglaries here in Cedar City.
Also in further investigation Mr. Deveraux had a RV. In that RV, your
Honor, there was thousands of dollars worth of stolen property from various
locations. Mr. Deveraux also confessed of [sic] 17 burglaries in the St. George
area, your Honor.
He's been very cooperative, but the Court must know the width of this
case. We charged him with - - one of the burglaries as per the plea negotiation
and cooperation, the attempted burglary are all homes here in Cedar City that
occurred approximately November 7th, and the possession of stolen property
is some property that was stolen from the St. George area, and that amount was
over $5,000.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief as to issues one, two and
three, asserting that those challenges are frivolous. The State agrees that those claims have
no basis in the law, and therefore defendant is not entitled to relief.
4

Defendant is also not entitled to relief based on his claims of sentencing errors.
Defense counsel invited any error by making a sentencing recommendation for consecutive
sentences. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to appellate relief. In addition, the trial court
did not err by proceeding with sentencing when the prosecutor recommended consecutive
sentences, because the prosecutor had never promised to recommend concurrent sentences.
The trial court also did not err by ordering that the Utah sentences run consecutive to
defendant's Alaska case, and then remanding defendant to the Utah Department of
Corrections.
ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR A CLAIM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN
DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY AND FAILED TO PROCEED
WITH A MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA

On appeal, defendant raises an issue as to whether a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel was waived by entry of his guilty plea and failure to proceed with a motion to
withdraw his plea (Aplt. Br. at 1). Defendant's appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief
in connection with that claim, conceding that "Utah law unequivocally provides that
ineffective assistance claims for defendants who plead guilty are waived if not raised until
after sentence is imposed, where no motion to withdraw plea was made prior thereto." (Aplt.
Br. at 8). Defendant also concedes that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this claim
(Aplt. Br. at 8). The State agrees that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim of

5

ineffective assistance of counsel, when defendant failed to proceed with a motion to
withdraw his pleas.
Several days after entry of his guilty pleas, defendant filed a letter with the court
asking the court to schedule a hearing so that he could ask to replace his counsel and move
to withdraw his guilty pleas (R53-54). A week later, defendant filed another letter, asking
the court to disregard his prior request to withdraw his pleas (R58). At a subsequent hearing,
defendant, on the record, withdrew both the motion for new counsel and the motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas (R124).
In this case, although defendant did originally file a timely motion to withdraw his
pleas, he then withdrew both his motion to withdraw plea and his motion for new counsel.
Therefore no timely motion was before the district court because defendant withdrew the
motions. Where no timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea is filed, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to reach defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal.
State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,ffi[6-8, 40 P.3d 646; State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, %39 40
P.3d 630; State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, % 48, 114 P.3d 585.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT

On appeal, defendant raises an issue as to whether the court abused its discretion in
imposing sentence providing for one count to run consecutive to the other two counts, and
the entire sentence to run consecutive to defendant's Alaska case (Aplt. Br. at 1).
Defendant's appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief in connection with that claim,

6

conceding that defendant was sentenced within the legal parameters for the crimes for which
he was convicted, and that the record does not reveal any reasonable argument for the
position that the court abused its discretion (Aplt. Br. at 8). The State agrees with appellate
counsel's conclusion.
"The sentencing judge 'has broad discretion in imposing [a] sentence within the
statutory scope provided by the legislature.'" State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, % 3, 73
P.3d991 (quoting State v. Rhodes, 818P.2d 1048,1051 (Utah App. 1991)). This Court "will
not overturn a sentence unless it exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed
to consider 'all the legally relevant factors,' State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah
App. 1997), or 'the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of
discretion.' Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051." Id. An '"appellate court can properly find abuse [of
discretion] only if it can be said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by
the trial court. "'State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 411,^6, 82P.3d211 (citingStatev. Gerrard,
584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. Utah's Criminal
Code provides that a person convicted of a second degree felony may be sentenced to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment for "a term of not less than one year nor more than 15
years." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (West 2004). It also provides that a person convicted
of a third degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term "not
to exceed five years." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3). Defendant's terms do not exceed
those limits.
7

Defendant was convicted of three felony offenses. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1)
(West 2004) gives the court discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences "if a
defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense." The record here shows
that, before making the decision to impose a consecutive term, the court properly considered
"the gravity and circumstances of the offenses [and] the history, character, and rehabilitative
needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2); (R125).
Under the circumstances of this case, "it can[not] be said that no reasonable person
would" impose the sentence imposed by the trial court. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ^ 6
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The State therefore agrees with defendant's
appellate counsel that defendant's challenge to his sentences is without legal basis.
III.

DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY WITHDREW HIS MOTIONS
TO WITHDRAW PLEA AND FOR NEW COUNSEL;
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DID NOT
RULE ON THE MOTIONS

On appeal, defendant raises an issue as to whether the trial court erred in denying his
motion to withdraw plea and for new counsel (Aplt. Br. at 2). Defendant's appellate counsel
has filed an Anders brief in connection with that claim, conceding that the motions were
withdrawn by the defendant, and thus were not denied by the court (Aplt. Br. at 8). The State
agrees with appellate counsel's conclusion.
As addressed above, several days after entry of his guilty pleas, defendant filed a letter
with the court asking the court to schedule a hearing so that he could ask to replace his
counsel and move to withdraw his guilty pleas (R53-54). A week later, defendant filed
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another letter that asked the court to disregard his request to withdraw his pleas (R58). At
a subsequent hearing, defendant, on the record, withdrew both the motion for new counsel
and the motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R124).
Defendant voluntarily withdrew his motion to withdraw plea and his motion for new
counsel. Therefore, the motions were not denied by the court. The motions were simply
never submitted for decision because they were voluntarily withdrawn by the defendant.
There can be no valid argument that the court denied the motions because the motions were
withdrawn (R124).
IV.

THE PROSECUTION DID NOT PROMISE TO RECOMMEND
CONCURRENT SENTENCES; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ERR IN PROCEEDING WITH SENTENCING
WHEN THE PROSECUTORRECOMMENDED CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in proceeding with sentencing
despite the prosecutor's reneging on a promise to recommend concurrent sentences. (Aplt.
Br. at 11). Defendant is not entitled to relief on this claim because he invited any error and
because the prosecutor never promised to recommend concurrent sentences. Therefore, the
trial court did not err in proceeding with sentencing when the prosecutor recommended
consecutive sentences.
A.

Defendant invited any error.

Defense counsel invited any error by making a sentencing recommendation for
consecutive sentences. After the prosecutor recommended consecutive sentences, defense
counsel said: "where we do have three offenses here, there's probably another option the
9

Court could consider, and that is to - - you could make some of them consecutive and some
concurrent." (R125:12). And that is exactly what the court did.
The court ordered that counts I and III (the burglary and the attempted burglary that
were alleged to have occurred on the same day in Iron county) be served concurrently
(R125:13, 15). However, count II, for possession of stolen properly (which included
property other than what he was alleged to have taken in the burglaries in Iron county), was
ordered to be served consecutive to counts I and III (R125:13,15). The court said: "So Mr.
Jackson [defense counsel] I believe that you're accurate. I think that this is an appropriate
case where there be some consecutive and some concurrent, and that's what I've done
(R125:15).
Under these factual circumstances, defendant's claim should be precluded by the
invited error doctrine. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, *f 9, 86 P.3d 742. The invited
error rule "prevents a party from' "takfing] advantage of an error committed at trial when that
party led the trial court into committing the error.'"" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54,
70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)).
The trial court did not err by proceeding with sentencing after the prosecutor
recommended consecutive sentences, because defense counsel invited any error by
recommending to the court that it "could make some of them consecutive and some
concurrent." (R125:12).

10

B.

The record fails to establish that the prosecutor
promised to recommend concurrent sentences.

Defendant pled guilty. His written statement in support of his guilty plea says that
"[a]ll promises, duties, and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in
this statement" (R43). The statement does not contain any agreement that the prosecutor
would recommend concurrent sentences. The statement says: "I understand that the State of
Utah will be requesting the preparation of a presentence investigation report to aid in my
sentencing. No other promises have been made to induce me to plead guilty." (R42-43).
In his certification of voluntariness, the defendant states: "I am entering this plea of
my own free will and choice. No force, threats, o[r] unlawful influence of any kind have
been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this statement
have been made to me (R42).
At the plea hearing, the court asked defendant if he had read the statement of
defendant in support of guilty plea. The defendant said that he had. The court then asked
if defendant had read every word, and defendant acknowledged "Every word." (R123:12).
The court then asked if defendant understood it, and defendant answered "Yes" and told the
court that he had no questions about it (R123:12-13).
At the plea hearing, the court specifically asked defendant: "Have any promises been
made other than what we've placed on the record here today?" Defendant answered "No,
sir." (R123:12). At the plea hearing, the prosecutor did not promise to recommend
concurrent sentences (R123). In fact, the prosecutor told the court "we are asking for a pre-
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sentence investigation" (R123:3). Since the prosecutor was asking for a presentence
investigation, he likely had not and would not have made any sentencing recommendation
until reviewing the presentence report.
When defendant told the court he wanted to waive the minimum time period and go
forward with sentencing that day, the prosecutor again told the court that the State's
"recommendation, obviously, would [be] to do apre-sentence investigation." (R123:15-16).
The court asked defendant if he understood that the court could sentence him to
consecutive prison terms. Defendant answered "Yes, your Honor." (R123:17). The court
then asked the prosecutor if he had a recommendation for sentencing, or any information to
show the court. Id.
The prosecutor shared the following information with the court:
I'm just going to show you the information I know, your Honor.
Looking at Mr. Deveraux's record, your Honor, he does have quite an
extensive record, mostly out of Alaska.
I do have a description of charges. I don't have dispositions, but there's
lots of charges. So I don't know in terms of disposition. I think he has been
in prison before, your Honor.
They do have - - you know, I have a spreadsheet that's six, seven pages
long. I know that they are looking for him, and I believe he has absconded
from Alaska. So they want to extradite him. They are interested (inaudible)
bringing him forward, so I'm not sure of the status. I'm not sure if he escaped
from the facility there o[r] if he has pending charges. I don't know the status
of that.
* * *

Other information is I know that he's kind of signed immunity, I
believe, with Washington County, he admitted to 17 burglaries there. They're
only going to charge him with one, and that's still pending. I don't think he's
entered a plea there yet.
(R123:17-19).
12

The prosecutor then recommended prison, but did not make any recommendation as
to concurrent or consecutive sentences. He said: "I suspect that if we did a PSI it would
come back the recommendation as prison, and that would be our recommendation as well."
(R123:19). Defense counsel said: "He knows he's going to prison. I mean the pre-sentence
report - -1 mean he knows that that's what the recommendation is going to be." (R123:20).
The court then imposed sentence and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively
(R123:23).
Following sentencing, defendant asked if the PSI would have made a difference
(R123:24). The court said: "Well, now that I've sentenced you to the maximum, you want
to back off and have another shot at it?" Id. The following exchange then occurred:
MR. DEVERAUX: Well, I was told - -1 mean right from the start here that
I'd be looking at maybe a year in prison here for this, and that it would all be
run concurrent. That's why I've been cooperating. I was even told from St.
George that they - - this would all be run concurrent together if I cooperated.
THE COURT: No one talked to me.
MR. DEVERAUX: And then talking with my attorney today, he's been telling
that this won't - - it won't be a problem with going to this - - you know, me - if I take this deal he said, "Don't worry about what this says."
MR. JACKSON: [defense counsel] Now, Mr. Deveraux, if you're going to tell
what I gave as terms of advice, you've got to point out the fact that I advised
you that this Judge has the decision.
MR. DEVERAUX: Correct.
MR JACKSON: It was not my advice that you waive the pre-sentence
investigation report. You wanted to do that. You wanted to take that risk and
get it all done today. I told you what the consequence of that could possibly
be, and certainly the Judge has made a point of that.
13

MR DEVERAUX: The jur - - okay. All I know is that you told me that Mr.
Little [the prosecutor] was agreeing that it shouldn't be no problem - - now tell
me if I'm wrong here, that it shouldn't be - - that he was going to recommend
and that you was going to talk to the Judge - MR. JACKSON: I just did.
MR. DEVERAUX: And that you told me - MR. JACKSON: I told you that the Judge - - we have no way of binding the
Judge. It's the Judge's decision.
(R123:24-25).
After further discussion with the prosecutor and defense counsel, the court agreed to
recall the sentence and order a presentence report (R123:26). However, he also warned
defendant that he didn't know that it was going to make any difference. Id.
Nowhere in the entire record is there any promise or agreement by the prosecutor to
recommend concurrent sentences. The prosecutor did not make any recommendation at all
as to whether the sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, either in the written plea
statement or at the plea hearing or at the initial sentencing. Nothing in the record establishes
or even suggests that the prosecutor ever promised or agreed to recommend concurrent
sentences.
When defendant later appeared for sentencing following preparation of the PSI report,
defense counsel said:
Counsel and I did talk somewhat about this, your Honor. The
circumstances are these. When Mr. Deveraux first entered into this plea
agreement, there were some things said and some things understood.
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I think one of the things that was talked about was that the county
attorney's office at the time that they made this offer to him to plead to these
three charges was going to recommend that there be - - that at least the three
charges - - these three charges, they would recommend that they run
concurrent.
They weren't really sure what they would do with regard to the
Washington County charges because they weren't filed then. So there was
also a suggestion that they might make that recommendation provided what
turned out on the police report - - or excuse me, on the pre-sentence report.
But it was clearly contemplated that there would be a pre-sentence
investigation.
Mr. Deveraux basically wanted to go ahead and have sentencing done
at that point. That was not something that was agreed to. So when he had me
request that this Court go forward with sentencing on the day that he entered
into the plea, I think Mr. Little [the prosecutor] felt that it was, know you [sic]
basically that wasn't part of this agreement, so he was standing behind that the
matter be served consecutive for the same reasons that I believe the Court did,
which we don't know anything about Mr. Deveraux, we're not going to go
there until we see more about him.
(R125:5-6).
However, the prosecutor disagreed with defense counsel's statement concerning any
prior agreement:
MR. GARRET [the prosecutor]: As you know, Mr. Little is the one that
handled this case at the entry of plea. I am not aware of any promises that
were made throughout the course of this case where the State agreed to run
these charges concurrent.
THE COURT: That was placed on the record.
MR GARRET: And that was my point. In looking at the plea agreement, it
promises that there would be an amended Information filed, and that we would
ask for a pre-sentence investigation report, and then the State put no other
promises have been made to induce him to plead guilty.
So I'm taking the position that that promise was not made, and I would
like to argue that this defendant be ordered to serve his sentences
consecutively.

15

(R125:8).
In his brief, defendant argues that when the prosecutor disavowed any promise, "the
Court responded by indicating that the promise had been put on the record." (Aplt. br. 11).
This is not correct. Not only is there no promise anywhere in the record, but defendant's
version of the court's comment misinterprets what the court said.
When the prosecutor disavowed any promise, the court said "That was placed on the
record." (R125:8). No promise to recommend concurrent sentences appears anywhere in the
record. What was placed on the record, at the plea hearing, was that "[n]o other promises"
had been made to induce defendant to plead guilty (R42-43). Therefore, the court's
statement "That was placed on the record" can only mean that the fact that the prosecutor
made no promise was placed on the record. In the alternative, in a worst case scenario, it
could mean even if there were such a promise, no promise was ever placed on the record.
However, it cannot mean that a promise to recommend concurrent sentences was placed on
the record, because no such promise exists anywhere in the record. Defendant is not entitled
to appellate relief because he has failed to establish that the prosecutor promised to
recommend concurrent sentences.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY ORDERING THE
UTAH SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECUTIVE TO A PREEXISTING ALASKA SENTENCE, AND THEN REMANDING
DEFENDANT TO THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering the Utah prison terms to be
served consecutively to the Alaska case, and then remanding defendant to the Utah
16

Department of Corrections (Aplt. Br. 13-14).2 Defendant argues that he "cannot serve his
Utah sentence consecutive to a sentence in Alaska unless he is first sent to Alaska to serve
his sentence there." (Aplt. Br. 13). Defendant argues that to say that the Utah terms were
to run consecutively to the Alaska term, "by definition means that the Utah term [had] to be
served after the Alaska term." (Aplt. Br. 14). Defendant cites no authority in support of his
novel definition of the term "consecutive."
Black's law dictionary defines consecutive sentences as "[t]wo or more sentences of
jail time to be served in sequence." Black's Law Dictionary, 1367 (7th ed. 1999).
Consecutive sentences may also be called "cumulative sentences" or "accumulative
sentences." Id. Therefore, consecutive sentences are merely sentences to be served in
sequence, following each other.
The Court's order that the Utah sentences were to be consecutive to the Alaska case
simply means that the time served is to be cumulative, not concurrent. It does not mean that
the Alaska sentence had to be served first. It merely means that the Alaska and Utah
sentences are to be served in sequence, one after the other - regardless of which is served
first.
The trial court did not err by imposing consecutive sentences and then remanding
defendant to the Utah Department of Corrections.

2

Defendant failed to raise this claim in the trial court. Therefore, this claim can
only be reviewed for plain error.
17

CONCLUSION
Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court erred at sentencing. In addition,
arguments one, two and three advanced by defendant are frivolous and defense counsel
complied with the mandates of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), State v. Clayton,
639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990), and State v. Wells,
2000 UT App 304, 13 P.3d 1056 (per curiam). Therefore, this Court should affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence.

ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED }(#_ December 2005.

MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
/

yZ<^r^

ERIN RILEY
Assistant Attorney General
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-203

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*I Chapter 3. Punishments
*! Part 2. Sentencing
-•§ 76-3-203. Felony conviction—Indeterminate term of imprisonment
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term of not less than five years and which may be for life.
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years.
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-203; Laws 1976, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 88, § 1;
Laws 1983, c. 88, § 5; Laws 1995, c. 244, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c.
289, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 214, § 1, eff. March 14, 2000; Laws
2003, c. 148, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2003, c. 148, substantially rewrote this section that formerly provided:
"(1) As used in this section, 'dangerous weapon1 has the same definition as in
Section 76-1-601.
"(2) A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment
for an indeterminate term as follows:
" (a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term of not less than five
years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life,
but if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon
was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall sentence
the person convicted for a term of not less than six years, and which may be for
life.
" (b) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of not less than one
year nor more than 15 years, but if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the
felony, the court shall sentence the person convicted for a term of not less than
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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two years nor more than 15 years; and the court may sentence the person convicted
for a term of not less than two years nor more than 20 years.
"(c) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed five
years, but if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall
sentence the person convicted for a term of not less than one year nor more than
five years; and the court may sentence the person convicted for a term of not
less than one year nor more than ten years.
" (d) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any person who has
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon
was used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony and is subsequently
convicted of another felony when a dangerous weapon was used in the commission of
or furtherance of the felony shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed, be
sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not less than five nor more than ten
years to run consecutively and not concurrently."
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-203, UT ST § 76-3-203

Current through end of 2005 First Special Session
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-401

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*I Chapter 3. Punishments
*i Part 4. Limitations and Special Provisions on Sentences
-+§ 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive

sentences—Limitations—Definition

(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the
offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate m the order of
judgment and commitment:
(a) if the
other; and

sentences

imposed

are

to

run

concurrently

or

consecutively

(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving.

or

to

each

consecutively

(2)
In
determining
whether
state
offenses
are
to
run
concurrently
or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative
needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole,
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would
be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences
are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court
shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to
run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under
Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection

(6)(a) does not apply if:

(I) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or

authorizes
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(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection

(6)(a) applies if a defendant:

(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial
sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6) (a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a
single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as
follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and

the

30-year

limitation,

(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.

the maximum

term,

if any,

(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served
under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not
been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where
the person is located.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1;
Laws 1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c.
283, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002,
c. 129, § 1, eff. July 1, 2002.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
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Laws 2002, c. 129, substantially rewrote this section that formerly provided:

"(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the
offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court
states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
"(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would
be inappropriate.
"(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences shall
run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole has reason
to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was imprisoned or on
parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request clarification from the
court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter an amended order of
commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
"(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences.
" (5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
"(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under
Subsection (6)(b).
"(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
" ( I ) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty
or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
" ( n ) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
"(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
"(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
"(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
" (c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial
sentencing by any other court.
"(8) When the limitation of Subsection

(6) (a) applies, determining
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consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a
single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison
terms as follows:
" (a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and

the

30-year

limitation,

" (b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.

the maximum

term,

if

any,

"(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser sentence shall
merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the
sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence with the
most recent conviction constituting the time to be served.
"(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served
under the commitments.
"(11) This section may not be construed to limit
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.

the

authority

of

a

court

to

"(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not
been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where
the person is located."
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-401, UT ST § 76-3-401
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